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BOOK REVIEW 
UNDER THE EMPIRICAL RADAR: AN INITIAL 
EXPRESSIVE LAW ANALYSIS OF THE ADA 
Michael Ashley Stein* 
Rights of Inclusion: Law and Identity in the Life Stories of 
Americans with Disabilities. By David M. Engel & Frank W. 
Munger. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 2003. 
INTRODUCTION 
UWJHILE enacting the Americans with Disabilities Act 
("ADA"),1 Senators Harkin and Kennedy each proclaimed its 
passage as an "emancipation proclamation" for people with disabili- 
ties.2 Fourteen years later,3 one wonders just how much (if at all) the 
disabled have been emancipated.4 
* Associate Professor, William & Mary School of Law; Visiting Scholar, Harvard 
Law School (2004); Visiting Fellow, Harvard Human Rights Program (2004). I thank 
Peter Blanck, Dennis Callahan, and Alex Geisinger for their comments; Sarah Black 
and law librarian Fred Dingledy for their superlative assistance; and Penelope Stein 
for inspiring belief in the power of transformation. My research was funded by an 
American Counsel of Learned Societies Andrew W. Mellon Fellowship. 
42 U.S.C. ?? 12101-12213 (2000). The focus of this Review is the employment sub- 
chapter (Title I) of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. ?? 12111-12117. 
2136 Cong. Rec. 17,369 (1990) (statement of Sen. Harkin); 135 Cong. Rec. 19,888 
(1989) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
3Twelve years later, if one counts from the time the statute's equal employment 
provisions became operative on July 26, 1992. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, ? 108, 104 Stat. 327, 337 (1990). The provisions have ap- 
plied to certain employers for only ten years. See id. ? 101(5)(A), 104 Stat. at 330 
(providing that Title I apply to employers of more than twenty-five workers until July 
26, 1994, thence to workplaces with more than fifteen employees). 
4 
ventured a preliminary consideration of the question of disability employment as 
a measure of the ADA's efficacy seven years ago in Michael Ashley Stein, Employing 
People with Disabilities: Some Cautionary Thoughts for a Second Generation Civil 
Rights Statute, Speech at the University of Iowa (1997), in Employment, Disability, 
and the Americans with Disabilities Act: Issues in Law, Public Policy, and Research 
51 (Peter David Blanck ed., 2000). 
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One way to gauge whether social and economic empowerment 
has increased for people with disabilities after the ADA's passage 
is to examine their employment experiences.5 To date, empirical 
studies of post-ADA disabled employees' labor market participa- 
tion are less than encouraging.6 Notably, two well-publicized em- 
pirical studies of the relative post-ADA employment effects on 
workers with disabilities found an overall reduction in the em- 
ployment rate, concurrent with a neutral effect on wages.7 These 
studies have sparked a growing debate among scholars who either 
5 As stated eloquently by Professor Vicki Schultz: 
Our historical conception of citizenship, our sense of community, and our sense 
that we are of value to the world all depend importantly on the work we do for 
a living and how it is organized and understood by the larger society. In every- 
day language, we are what we do for a living. 
Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1881, 1884 (2000). For additional, 
complementary views on the connection between work, citizenship, and self-worth 
see Judith N. Shklar, American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion 63-101 (1991) 
(exploring the connection between work and citizenship in a democracy); Cynthia L. 
Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89 Geo. L.J. 
1, 2-4 (2000) (arguing for the workplace as a "vehicle of civic engagement"); Gregory 
S. Kavka, Disability and the Right to Work, 9 Soc. Phil. & Pol'y 262, 263-64 (1992) 
(arguing for a moral and legal right to work for disabled citizens). 
6 One commentator has characterized the "statute's impact," with tongue firmly in 
cheek, as being "anything but radical." See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans 
with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 921, 923 (2003). 
7 See Daron Acemoglu & Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences of Employment Protec- 
tion? The Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 109 J. Pol. Econ. 915, 929-33 
(2001); Thomas DeLeire, The Wage and Employment Effects of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 35 J. Hum. Resources 691, 700-08 (2000). Professor DeLeire utilized 
data panels of men aged eighteen to sixty-four from the Survey of Income and Pro- 
gram Participation (SIPP) from 1986-1993. Id. at 697-98. He concluded that after the 
ADA's passage, the average employment level of men with disabilities decreased 
7.2% relative to that of men without disabilities. Id. at 705. Over the same period, 
DeLeire did not discern a change in disabled workers' relative earnings. Id. Professors 
Acemoglu and Angrist culled their results from the 1988-1997 Current Population 
Survey (CPS) data for both men and women age twenty-one to fifty-eight. Acemoglu 
& Angrist, supra, at 916-17. These results generally corroborate DeLeire's findings, 
but in greater detail. Acemoglu and Angrist found that, for the twenty-one to thirty- 
nine age group, the relative employment level of disabled workers declined by ten to 
fifteen percent with respect to the number of weekly hours worked. Id. at 930-32. 
Across the forty to fifty-eight age group, Acemoglu and Angrist did not discover a 
relative effect upon women with disabilities. Id. The employment level for men with 
disabilities, however, did decrease significantly. Id. The overall relative wage level of 
workers with disabilities was unchanged. Id. 
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support8 or challenge9 their findings. Nonetheless, even those 
economists seeking to explain the available data within the context 
of broader economic effects10 concede that post-ADA disability- 
related employment (broadly defined) has not dramatically im- 
proved.11 At the same time, plaintiffs asserting ADA Title I em- 
ployment discrimination claims in the federal courts have a lower 
win-loss rate than any other group excepting prisoner-rights liti- 
gants.12 Specifically, an American Bar Association report found 
that employers prevailed in about ninety-two percent of Title I 
cases between 1992 and 1997.13 Although a number of factors may 
8For example, Professor Christine Jolls identifies the circumstances under which 
accommodation mandates are likely to reduce a given group's employment level or 
wages. See Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 223 (2000). 
She posits that in the case of workers with disabilities, restrictions on employment dif- 
ferentials are unlikely to be binding, while restrictions on wage differentials are likely 
to be binding. Id. at 274-75. Consequently, Jolls's model predicts that the relative 
post-ADA wages of disabled workers will increase or remain unchanged, while the 
employment rate will continue to decrease. Id. at 275. 
9See, e.g., Susan Schwochau & Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the Ameri- 
cans with Disabilities Act, Part III: Does the ADA Disable the Disabled?, 21 Berke- 
ley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 271, 293-312 (2000) (presenting detailed econometric objec- 
tions to the two post-ADA employment studies). For an updated version of their 
critique, see Susan Schwochau & Peter Blanck, Does the ADA Disable the Dis- 
abled?-More Comments, 42 Indus. Rel. 67 (2003). 10 For the most current detailed treatments of this subject, see The Decline in Em- 
ployment of People with Disabilities: A Policy Puzzle (David C. Stapleton & Richard 
V. Burkhauser eds., 2003); Symposium, Disability and Employment, 42 Indus. Rel. 1 
(2003). 11 See, e.g., Richard V. Burkhauser & David C. Stapleton, A Review of the Evi- 
dence and Its Implications for Policy Change, in The Decline in Employment of Peo- 
ple with Disabilities: A Policy Puzzle, supra note 10, at 369, 373 (reporting that all the 
authors agree that "[t]he employment rate for working-aged adults with disabilities, 
broadly defined, has declined during the 1990s, both absolutely and relative to the 
rate for those without disabilities"). 
12 See Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights 
and Prisoner Cases, 77 Geo. L.J. 1567, 1578 (1989) (setting forth data establishing the 
low success rate of prisoner plaintiffs in civil rights litigation). 
13 Am. Bar Ass'n, Study Finds Employers Win Most ADA Title I Judicial and Ad- 
ministrative Complaints, 22 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 403, 403 (1998). A 
subsequent study found that employers won at a rate of approximately ninety-three 
percent. Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defen- 
dants, 34 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 99, 108-09 (1999). Professor Colker argues that 
plaintiffs frequently lose under the ADA because "[c]ourts are abusing the summary 
judgment device" by "refusing to send normative factual questions" to juries. Id. at 
101. 
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contribute to this phenomenon,14 the overall impression is dire. 
Thus, from a purely quantitative perspective, empirical analysis indi- 
cates that the ADA is not fulfilling its promise of empowering work- 
ers with disabilities. 
By contrast, Professors David Engel and Frank Munger's thought- 
ful book, Rights of Inclusion: Law and Identity in the Life Stories of 
Americans with Disabilities,1 applies a noneconomic metric to the 
question of whether the ADA is "working," and in so doing provides 
an alternative appraisal of the statute's efficacy.16 Utilizing qualitative 
analysis, Engel and Munger interviewed workers with disabilities 
who had never asserted disability-related employment discrimination 
claims.17 They conclude that the ADA's mere presence has changed 
disabled persons' identities by creating a vision of work-capable 
people who can be successful and vibrant employees if given the 
opportunity, including proper accommodations, to demonstrate 
these abilities. At the same time, Engel and Munger argue that the 
putative employment rights embodied in the ADA can only be 
14 These can include: technical misuse of pretrial motions in favor of defendants; ju- 
dicial opposition to the statute or indifference towards people with disabilities; claim- 
ants not falling within the statute's purview; plaintiffs feeling strongly enough to pur- 
sue nonwinning claims or having negative expectation value of settlement; 
informational asymmetry clouding the litigation decisionmaking process; poor lawyer- 
ing; or mediocre expert testimony. See Michael Ashley Stein, The Law and Econom- 
ics of Disability Accommodations, 53 Duke L.J. 79, 86, 90-96 (2003). 
"5 David M. Engel & Frank W. Munger, Rights of Inclusion: Law and Identity in the 
Life Stories of Americans with Disabilities (2003). 
16 This point has been previously noted: "Exploring alternative measures by which 
to gauge Title I's success can also enhance our understanding of the post-ADA em- 
ployment experiences of workers with disabilities." Michael Ashley Stein, Empirical 
Implications of Title I, 85 Iowa L. Rev. 1671, 1687 (2000). 
' An initial note on methodology is warranted. The authors conducted 180 prelimi- 
nary telephone interviews from which they selected sixty for full follow-up interviews. 
From that group, eight people were chosen for "repeat interviews," an unusual tech- 
nique in which the subjects were allowed to review what had been written about them 
and amend any errors. Six elected to do so. See Engel & Munger, supra note 15, at 7- 
9. A scholar given to empirical research could criticize the authors' methodology as 
being vulnerable to selection bias, meaning that they invited back people who could 
provide them with information they desired (just as a scholar using qualitative re- 
search might argue that the empirical method is subject to bias in developing its un- 
derlying assumptions). What is, however, somewhat troubling is that the initial cohort, 
while divided between individuals with physical disabilities (wheelchair users) and 
those with various learning disabilities, was culled from a narrow geographic region 
(western New York) and thus might have a somewhat limited perspective due to 
hegemonic cultural input. Id. at 7-8. 
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brought to fruition if people with disabilities understand and em- 
brace the statute's normative aspirations.18 Their assessment of the 
ADA as well as their subsequent proposal for a "new theory" of 
rights that can properly encompass the dynamics of disability iden- 
tity formation are therefore both internal and contextual to those 
individuals whose life stories are presented in Rights of Inclusion. 
This Review seeks to bridge the inquiries made by the two nor- 
mally exclusive disciplines of economics (the external, quantitative 
empirical radar) and sociology (the internal, qualitative assessment 
of rights discourse),'9 by presenting a third path: an initial expres- 
sive law analysis of the ADA (examining the phenomena that exist 
beneath the empirical radar).20 That approach considers how the 
external (law) can influence the internal (individual behavior) by 
altering broader social norms, an aspect of rights theory and 
change that is not addressed in Rights of Inclusion.21 In considering 
those precepts, I am particularly interested in building on the ex- 
pressive law gloss presented in Professor Alex Geisinger's "belief 
change" theory, which identifies and models a process through 
which regulations can affect norms and preferences.22 
18 Id. at 251. 
19 The metaphor of bridge building in this context, as well as the characterization 
that the disciplines exist at opposite poles, is drawn from the whimsical Ian Ayres, 
Never Confuse Efficiency with a Liver Complaint, 1997 Wis. L. Rev. 503, 506-07 (not- 
ing that among "those economists that do from time-to-time engage sociology, there 
are those who are Bridge-builders/Appeasers and those who are Openly Hostile"). 
With the exception of technical phrases and words of art, I have attempted through- 
out this Review to "translate" discipline-specific language into more readily accessible 
terms. 
20 My hope is that, as the first publication on this topic, this Review will be construed 
as an invitation to a continuing dialogue. 
21 See infra Section II.A. Ironically, inquiries into the effect that law can have on 
molding social norms and behavior were formally the intellectual province of law and 
society scholars, including the authors of Rights of Inclusion. See, e.g., Frank Munger, 
Miners and lawyers: law practice and class conflict in Appalachia, 1872-1920, in Law- 
yers in a postmodern world: translation and transgression 185 (Maureen Cain & 
Christine B. Harrington eds., 1994); David M. Engel, The Oven Bird's Song: Insiders, 
Outsiders and Personal Injuries in an American Community, 18 Law & Soc'y Rev. 
551 (1984). At the same time, it bears noting that neither Rights of Inclusion nor ex- 
pressive law scholarship (including, for the most part, this Review) adequately ac- 
count for exogenous factors (for example, public transportation and health care) that 
have a powerful effect on the efficacy of antidiscrimination orms. 
22 Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 Iowa L. Rev. 35 
(2002). This Review owes a large debt both to Geisinger's work and to his friendship. 
For an adumbration of his belief change theory, see infra Section II.B. 
2004] 1155 
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Part I will set forth the disability life stories chronicled by Engel 
and Munger and the conclusions they draw from those experiences 
about the nature of identity and rights theory. Next, Part II will de- 
scribe the general goals of expressive law scholarship and will out- 
line Geisinger's "belief change" theory. Part III will depict existing 
socio-legal norms on the disabled, as seen in recent United States 
Supreme Court decisions, and the aspirations contained in the 
ADA. Part IV will then set forth a preliminary expressive law 
analysis of the ADA. The Review will conclude by reinterpreting, 
from an expressive law perspective, some of the disability life sto- 
ries portrayed in Rights of Inclusion. 
I. A QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS: DISABILITY LIFE STORIES 
The central thesis of Rights of Inclusion is that disability-related 
rights become active in formal (that is, legal) and informal (mean- 
ing nonlegal) settings. Focusing on informal mechanisms, Engel 
and Munger conclude that the rights granted to persons with dis- 
abilities through the ADA had a powerful effect on many of the in- 
terviewees by fostering their self-image as capable and potentially 
successful employees. At the same time, the authors maintain that 
for the ADA to be effective, disabled employees must be aware of 
the nature and scope of their rights and understand that a violation 
of those rights has occurred. In consequence, Rights of Inclusion 
advocates a rights theory that can appropriately account for the re- 
cursive and internal nature of disability identity that arises through 
ADA-inspired rights formation. This Part sets forth Engel and 
Munger's conclusions-as presented in the context of their sub- 
jects' life stories-about the impact on rights formation of disabil- 
ity identity23 and extra-disability factors and their proposal for a 
new rights theory. 
A. Disability Identity Formation and its Impact on Rights 
Engel and Munger assert that, for the ADA to be effective, dis- 
abled employees must be aware of the existence of their rights, and 
23 For a similar approach, see Peter Blanck, Justice for All?: Stories about Ameri- 
cans with Disabilities and Their Civil Rights, 8 J. Gender Race & Just. (forthcoming 
2004). 
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of a subsequent rights violation.24 Such awareness is dependent on 
an individual's identity, the formation of which results from his or 
her interactive process with society at large.2 Because persons with 
disabilities are vulnerable to societal prejudice, they explain, the 
group as a whole is at high risk of internalizing generally held nega- 
tive misperceptions.26 As a result, societal pressure can prevent per- 
sons with disabilities from having a sense of entitlement to equal 
treatment in the workforce and in society as a whole.27 To illustrate 
this point, Rights of Inclusion examines the lives of both physically 
and learning disabled individuals and contrasts their experiences 
both within and across disability categories. 
According to Engel and Munger, physical limitations are viewed 
as disabilities because of a cultural construct that arbitrarily com- 
pares limitations against an arbitrary norm.2 If persons with dis- 
24 Thus, they argue that "the sense of self determines the perceptions of fairness and 
unfairness that precede any consideration of rights." Engel & Munger, supra note 15, 
at 16. 
25 As the authors put it: "The interactive process of identity formation shapes a 
sense of self that is consistent with either inclusion or exclusion in mainstream soci- 
ety." Id. at 44. The authors also turn to the philosopher Habermas for the proposition 
that identity is a result of an interactive and intersubjective process between self and 
society over time. Accordingly, "the basis for the assertion of one's own identity is not 
really self-identification, but intersubjectively recognized self-identification." Id. at 
43-44. 
26 Id. at 67-69. 
27 Id. at 68-69. 
28 The contention that disability is a social construct and thus the byproduct of ex- 
ogenous environmental factors is a mainstay of the Disability Studies Movement. See, 
e.g., Claire H. Liachowitz, Disability as a Social Construct: Legislative Roots (1988) 
(tracing the legal, limiting classification of disability); Richard K. Scotch, Making 
Change: The ADA as an Instrument of Social Reform, in Americans with Disabilities: 
Exploring Implications of the Law for Individuals and Institutions 275, 275 (Leslie 
Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds., 2000) (approving of "a social model of disabil- 
ity that conceptualizes disability as a social construction that is the result of interac- 
tion between physical or mental impairment and the social environment"); Susan 
Wendell, The Rejected Body: Feminist Philosophical Reflections on Disability 35 
(1996) (noting the difficulty in marking "the distinction between the biological reality 
of a disability and the social construction of a disability"); Ron Amundson, Disability, 
Handicap, and the Environment, 23 J. Soc. Phil. 105, 110 (1992) (stating that "[a] 
handicap results from the interaction between a disability and an environment"). For 
a review of this literature and its application to ADA-based rights, see Michael Ash- 
ley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as Antidis- 
crimination, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. (forthcoming December 2004). For a broader treat- 
ment of the meaning of difference in categorizing people and their rights, see Martha 
Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law (1990). 
2004] 1157 
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abilities succumb to this vision, their identity is "spoiled,"29 and 
they view themselves as "disabled" in the sense of feeling power- 
less. 0 To illustrate this contention, Rights of Inclusion contrasts the 
life experiences of two wheelchair users, Sara Lane and Rick 
Evans. 
Sara Lane is a personally and professionally successful adult be- 
cause, in large measure, she was able to tell a different story from 
the one which society would have imposed on her. Sara sees herself 
as a part of the mainstream and therefore views her disability as 
one part of her identity and social experience.31 She explains that 
"because my disability was so integrated into our family as a com- 
munity... because I was treated as an equal, as a peer, when I 
went to get a career, [when] I went to college, those barriers didn't 
exist in my mind."32 
By comparison, Rick Evans is an example of identity spoiling as 
a result of having conflated his self-worth and his disability. Unlike 
Sara, Rick has always been separated out from the mainstream.33 
During his primary and secondary schooling, his social interactions 
throughout life, and his professional experiences, he has lived what 
the authors term a "marginalized identity."34 Rick blames his lack 
of personal and professional success on his disability and the fail- 
ure of the ADA. He therefore feels powerless to be anything other 
than a victim of prejudice and circumstance.5 
Unlike a majority of physical disabilities, many learning disabili- 
ties are neither readily visible nor well recognized,36 and so their va- 
29The term references the seminal work by Erving Goffman. Erving Goffman, 
Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity (1963). 
Engel & Munger, supra note 15, at 46. 
31Id. at 54. 
2 Id. at 22. 
3Id. at 56. 
4 Id. at 42. 
35 Id. at 56-57. 36 This raises an interesting, but parenthetical issue. Pursuant to Title I, employers 
cannot, with certain exceptions, inquire into the history, existence, or extent of a per- 
son's disability. 42 U.S.C. ? 12112(d)(4)(A) (2000); see Chai Feldblum, Medical Ex- 
aminations and Inquiries Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: A View From 
the Inside, 64 Temp. L. Rev. 521, 531 (1991) (analyzing the medical examinations and 
inquiries section of the employment title of the ADA using legislative history). Con- 
versely, when a person has a disability that is not readily ascertainable and does not 
disclose to her employer the existence of her disability, she will not be protected un- 
der the ADA's auspices. Id. Similarly, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
1158 [Vol. 90:1151 
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lidity is often questioned.37 Consequently, Engel and Munger main- 
tain there is a strong temptation to "pass" as a person without a 
disability to avoid social stigma and subordination.38 Vicki Ken- 
nedy, for example, has never been formally diagnosed with a learn- 
ing disability and resists diagnosis. The absence of physical symp- 
toms makes her question the reality of her disability.39 Thus, Vicki 
does not consider asserting her disability-based rights, including 
if a person's religious convictions prevent her from performing her employment, she 
is not protected unless she had previously disclosed that limitation. See, e.g., Johnson 
v. Angelica Unif. Group, 762 F.2d 671, 673 (8th Cir. 1985) (denying recourse to an 
employee who was terminated for missing work on religious holidays because she had 
not informed her employer of the holidays). Thus, for purposes of attempting to en- 
culturate within a firm and avoid prejudice, when should a person with a nonvisible 
disability disclose that disability? This is an especially pertinent question if the disabil- 
ity in question is a cognitive disability that is likely, as demonstrated by the sources 
cited in note 37, infra, to encounter strong prejudice. Rights of Inclusion briefly 
touches on this issue by presenting the life story of Jim Vargas, a physical therapist 
with a learning disability. See Engel & Munger, supra note 15, at 126-30. Jim's im- 
pairment affects his job performance in that he has great difficulty keeping up with 
the paper work, though he stays late and works through lunch. Frustrated, he changes 
jobs often. Id. at 126-27. Jim's dilemma is whether to conceal or reveal his learning 
disability to employers at interviews. He has resolved to take an ad hoc approach, as 
revealing his disability can either hurt him (in that he might be met "with disbelief 
rather than understanding") or help him (in that he becomes legally eligible for ac- 
commodation and so employers cannot misinterpret the effects of his disability on job 
performance). Id. at 127. 37 This point is made by a number of commentators, most notably Susan Stefan. For 
her perspective on external stigma and subordination, see Susan Stefan, Hollow 
Promises: Employment Discrimination Against People with Mental Disabilities xiv- 
xv (2002); Susan Stefan, Unequal Rights: Discrimination Against People with Mental 
Disabilities and the Americans with Disabilities Act (2001). For her thoughts on the 
issue of stigma and identification within the disability community, see Susan Stefan, 
"Discredited" and "Discreditable": The Search for Political Identity by People with 
Psychiatric Diagnoses, 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1341 (2003). 
8Traditionally, the term "passing" has referred to people of color who subsume 
their racial identities in order to live among the mainstream as majority members. 
See, e.g., Brooke Kroeger, Passing: When People Can't Be Who They Are (2003); 
James M. O'Toole, Passing for White: Race, Religion, and the Healy Family, 1820- 
1920 (2002). At times the phenomenon of passing can also be involuntary, resulting 
from an individual's lack of knowledge regarding his family history. See, e.g., Gregory 
Howard Williams, Life on the Color Line: The True Story of a White Boy Who Dis- 
covered He Was Black (1995) (recounting the experiences of a former law school 
dean). Recently, the notion of passing has been applied to other groups. See, e.g., 
Passing: Identity and Interpretation in Sexuality, Race, and Religion (Maria Carla 
Sanchez & Linda Schlossberg eds., 2001). 39 Engel & Munger, supra note 15, at 61-62. 
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those contained in the ADA.4 Similarly, William Heinz was for- 
mally diagnosed as dyslexic and had a terrible experience in the 
special education system. Because he believes that his diagnosis fo- 
cused societal prejudices and misconceptions against him more 
strongly, William hides his learning disability from others.41 Like 
Vicki, William does not consider asserting rights related to his dis- 
ability under the ADA.4 
Conversely, Jill Golding's diagnosis with a learning disability as 
an adult was a powerfully transformative experience that allowed 
her to claim a place in the mainstream as a successful nurse. From 
a childhood when she and others viewed her as stupid, lazy, and 
undeserving of the mainstream, she has been able to access her 
abilities and talents and transform her sense of self in the process. 
This was because, after her diagnosis, Jill was able to forge a new 
identity, one in which she is capable, successful, and deserving of 
the mainstream.43 Knowing that she has legal rights under the 
ADA has allowed Jill to find the strength to assert those rights in- 
formally, to personal and professional advantage." 
B. Extra-Disability Factors Affecting Rights 
Engel and Munger identify social class, family, race, and gender45 
as extra-disability factors affecting the development of disability 
identity and its interplay with ADA rights.46 How an individual 
with a disability conceives of her opportunities and rights under the 
ADA, if she conceives of them at all, is linked to these contextual 
factors. Crucial to the overall ability of disabled employees to 
work, according to Rights of Inclusion, are the resources available 
40 Id. at 66. 
41 Id. at 62-65. 
42Id. at 66. 
43 In this respect, Jill's circumstance is a rarity. The authors note that few of the 
learning disabled people they interviewed "viewed their situation through such a 
rights-tinged lens. Jill's perspective is distinctive because it equates learning disabili- 
ties with physical disabilities ... and with the issue of racial discrimination." Id. at 34. 
44 Id. at 30-36. 
45 The authors, and hence this Review, use the term "gender" to refer to assigned 
social roles that cut across people's "sex," meaning their biological difference. Id. at 
214. 
46 Id. at 18-19. 
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to them at the point their careers first intersect with their disabili- 
ties.47 
The authors contend that social class affects identity formation 
in that the options a person believes are available, as well as the fu- 
ture he perceives as possible, are frequently dictated by social 
strata. As the child of uneducated Polish immigrants, Rosemary 
Sauter was expected to enter the workforce rather than attend col- 
lege and did so.48 There was no conception of learning disabilities in 
Rosemary's world, and she was thought by her family, teachers, 
and peers to be slothful and unintelligent.49 By contrast, Barry 
Swygert was raised in a supportive and middle-class home envi- 
ronment, and it was assumed that he would continue to be profes- 
sionally successful after the onset of his disability at the age of 
thirty. He and his social circle are aware of his rights and he has 
utilized government programs geared at helping persons with dis- 
abilities to participate in the workplace.50 
One's family situation, according to Engel and Munger, also af- 
fects identity formation. No one in Louise Dobbs's alcoholic, abu- 
sive, and dysfunctional family, including Louise, ever saw a future 
for her beyond manual labor and poverty. She has no notion of le- 
gal empowerment or assistance of any kind and believes that the 
paralysis she sustained following a stroke prevents her from ever 
returning to her old job in a chicken factory.5' Until dyslexic Wil- 
liam Thomas was transferred into a stable and supportive foster 
home, he did very poorly in school, despite receiving special educa- 
tion services.52 His strong mentoring relationship with a local lock- 
smith with whom he apprenticed taught William "how to be a man, 
how to carry [him]self, how to carry adversity."53 
Nevertheless, William's status as an impoverished African- 
American has limited his ambition. Although he will attend a jun- 
ior college, he has no conception that the ADA and the rights he 
holds under it could expand his career options beyond becoming a 
47 See generally id. at 168-238. 48 Rosemary worked as a dance teacher originally, but she now works as an operat- 
ing room nurse. Id. at 172, 175. 
9Id. at 168-74. 50 Id. at 100-03. 
51 Id. at 180-83. 
52 Id. at 184-86. 
53 Id. at 186. 
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locksmith.54 Contrast William with Evelyn Gardner, the child of an 
upwardly mobile working-class African family who was sent to 
study in the United States in the fifth grade. While her diagnosis as 
dyslexic while attending community college transformed her per- 
spective and her career plans, for Evelyn, race is associated with 
cultural differences and her immigrant status, rather than with in- 
justice.55 
For Engel and Munger, gender has perhaps the most nuanced ef- 
fect among extra-disability factors, in that it can impact how rights 
become active in four general ways. They found that gender: (1) af- 
fects the perceptions individuals have about "themselves as em- 
ployees"; (2) influences the willingness a person has to assert his or 
her rights; (3) negatively interplays with disability so that rights 
consciousness is absent from some personal narratives; and (4) 
positively interplays with the ADA to help persons with disabilities 
reconstruct their gender identities.56 
As an initial premise, Engel and Munger found (as do almost all 
feminist legal scholars) that gender roles influence career choices. 
While Rosemary Sauter was discouraged from math and mechani- 
cal drawing, and was instead expected to marry and raise children,57 
Mary Williams found success in the mainstream, in spite of her se- 
vere and undiagnosed learning disability, by finding a way to con- 
form to traditional gender roles via cosmetology.58 Dick Seaton was 
steered toward manual labor as a result of his learning disability 
and became a housepainter. Later, as a diagnosed adult, Dick con- 
sidered returning to school to pursue medicine. He never consid- 
ered nursing, though, because he perceived of it as womens' work.59 
54 Id. at 187. Specifically, he does not believe in the reasonable accommodations 
provision in the ADA and thinks that employers have the right not to hire learning 
disabled employees or provide them with accommodations. As William related in his 
interview: "You shouldn't discriminate nobody. But if it requires reading and you 
don't know how to do it, you just can't take the job.... Or shouldn't even apply for 
the job if you know it's reading." Id. He does not use the discourse of racial justice in 
telling his story and does not analogize his learning disability to race. Id. at 189. 55 Id. at 190-94. 
56 Id. at 236-37. Contrast, for instance, the interplay of racial identity and disability 
for Evelyn: "The discourse of racial justice appears to have little to do with the way 
she thinks and talks about her options." Id. at 193. 
57 Id. at 171-73. 
58 Id. at 221-25. 
59 Id. at 219-20. 
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Engel and Munger also recount instances of workers with dis- 
abilities who exploited their respective gender roles, rather than 
utilized their legal rights, to enter the mainstream. Beth Devon's 
approach to accommodation issues (albeit pre-ADA) was deter- 
mined in large part by gender roles and expectations. Instead of 
demanding accommodations from her employer, she cajoled him 
into providing them. Beth's gender modified her self-reliant atti- 
tude in that she took positive advantage of socially expected gen- 
der roles, transforming herself into a "girl Friday" to establish her- 
self in the workplace.60 Similarly, Sid Tegler approached the 
question of accommodation by becoming "one of the guys." 
Through stereotypical masculine behavior such as drunken antics 
in school and the development of a very "manly" demeanor, Sid 
believes he secured his position as an accountant in the mainstream 
by emulating his fellow workmen.61 
At the opposite end of the spectrum are those who use their dis- 
ability-grounded rights to reconstruct shattered gender identities. 
Jill Golding believes that her employer has a duty under the ADA 
to care for her in the same manner that she, as a nurse, cares for 
their mutual patients. Jill's legal rights have "positively reinforce[d] 
her perception of herself as a nurse and a woman."62 In the same 
vein, before his disabling injury, Al Vencenzo had asserted his 
male identity by playing hockey. Now, as a disabled person cogni- 
zant of the ADA, Al asserts his masculinity by prosecuting his legal 
rights.63 
The authors of Rights of Inclusion conclude that the essential 
element in the success of disabled employees participating in the 
workplace is the extent of the resources that could be accessed at 
the locus of rights and developing disability identities. They assert 
that the timing of both disability and the passage of the ADA in an 
individual's life cycle impact that individual's identity formation. 
To illustrate, after developing a disability at age thirty due to a spi- 
60 Id. at 228. Along these lines, Beth believes that personal appearance is crucial 
when looking for (and working at) a job. She believes that persons using wheelchairs 
should keep them clean and comments that "a lot of men don't clean their chairs," 
while she spends "hours at a time cleaning hers until all the lines [are] sleek" because 
"[y]our chair is part of you, just like your shoes." Id. at 210. 6 Id. at 227-29. 62 Id. at 232. 
63 Id. at 234-35. 
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nal tumor, Barry Swygert views his post-ADA disability as an im- 
portant element of his identity, but in a way that is empowering 
rather than debilitating.64 Sara Lane, who describes herself as a 
"type A polio victim," was brought up at a time when people were 
"taught to respond to childhood polio with resilience and to pursue 
lofty career goals with high expectations."65 Because she was taught 
to be self-reliant, Sara is reluctant to formally activate her ADA 
rights, although she does feel that the passage of the ADA influ- 
enced her identity as one entitled to the mainstream.66 Having also 
contracted polio as a child, Beth Devon similarly did not feel stig- 
matized by her disability or "marked as 'different."'67 Nevertheless, 
because Beth's work experience as an accountant preceded pas- 
sage of the ADA, she could not rely on its accommodation provi- 
sions and had to persuade her employer to make workplace modi- 
fications on her behalf.68 
C. A New Rights Theory 
As the result of their findings, Engel and Munger proffer a new 
rights theory, one they believe is conducive to the ADA's aspira- 
tions and influence. In their view, traditional rights theories fail to 
adequately interrelate with disability rights.69 Moreover, although 
the ADA is rarely invoked in a formal manner, it does profoundly 
affect individual identity.70 Thus, the true measure of the effective- 
ness of the ADA lies not in how often persons with disabilities as- 
sert their legal rights (or prevail in litigation), but in how those 
people identify themselves in relation to others.71 
Under "classical rights" theory, rights exist to mitigate the barri- 
ers that prevent people from achieving specific purposes and iden- 
tities-for example, working as a means of being a full citizen.72 As 
the authors put it: 
64 Id. at 100-03. 65 Id. at 196. 
66 Id. at 197. 
67 Id. at 206. 
68 Id. at 207-09. 
69 This is because "the challenges of identity formation differ for persons with physi- 
cal and learning disabilities." Id. at 16. 
70 Id. at 80. 
71 Id. at 40. 
72 See id. at 80-82. 
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In the classic conception, rights do not merely entitle an individ- 
ual to do something-vote, attend an integrated school, receive 
due process, worship, or marry. They also entitle each individual 
to be someone-to be recognized by others as a citizen, as a 
member of society, as an autonomous individual within the 
American democracy.73 
Because barriers exist to the implementation of rights and their 
identity-altering effects, the goal of classical rights theory scholars 
and legislators is to identify and mitigate these barriers.74 Neverthe- 
less, although classical rights theory has mythic significance in the 
minds of the interviewees, Rights of Inclusion asserts that it has lit- 
tle practical import because none of those individuals had formally 
invoked their rights through suit.75 
According to the "rights versus relationship" model, as individ- 
ual identity is distributed amongst social relationships, the formal 
assertion of rights can damage the relationships that constitute in- 
dividual identity.76 This is because identity is "'distributed' within 
social relationships," and thus, "the theorized opposition of rights 
and relationships implies significant limitations for the constitutive 
effects of the ADA."77 Examining rights from this perspective im- 
plies that the ADA may increase the exclusion of people with dis- 
abilities from the mainstream and harm the identity of people with 
disabilities by destroying the personal relationships from which 
identity stems.78 Moreover, as none of the interviewees formally in- 
voked her rights, and so none jeopardized her relationship in the 
way that Engel and Munger's theory hypothesizes, the "rights ver- 
73 Id. at 83. 
74 Id. 
7 Id. at 96-97. 
76 Id. at 84-85. 
7 Id. at 84. 
78Id. at 85-86. According to the authors, this is because the continuum of mecha- 
nisms regulating social interactions spans from the formal to the informal. Id. at 84. 
Legal rights are the far end of the formal portion of this continuum and have little 
impact on the informal end. Id. Where relationships are strong, legal rights play an 
insignificant role. Where relationships are weak, legal rights play a strong role. Id. 
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sus relationship" model is inapposite to their examination of ADA 
rights.79 
"Critical rights theory" posits that formally granted rights are il- 
lusions and tools of oppression. Because of the presence of legal 
"rights," oppressed people do not view themselves as being subor- 
dinated.80 Yet, Rights of Inclusion asserts that the constitutive ef- 
fects of legal rights depend on context. Rights are not harmful for 
those who do not have a mistaken belief that the mere possession 
of legal rights is indicative of the possession of social equality.81 
Furthermore, at a minimum, interviewees were not "fooled" into a 
false consciousness of rights. Hence, critical rights theory fails to 
account for the ambiguity most interviewees felt about their 
rights.82 
In contrast, Engel and Munger aver that the ADA challenges 
the historical view that disability means unemployability and reaf- 
firms historical attitudes about disability, in the sense that it re- 
quires a differentiation of persons with disabilities from persons 
without disabilities in a potentially stigmatizing way.83 This recur- 
sive effect, both positive and negative, of the ADA on rights and 
identity can be seen in Engel and Munger's comparison of Barry 
Swygert's experiences with those of Raymond Militello. Although 
Barry never formally invoked the ADA after the onset of his pa- 
ralysis, the statute transformed his self-perception and enabled him 
to "reconstitute his identity" and retain his "ambitious" career 
plans.84 He became rights-conscious through "cultural and discur- 
sive" shifts that were engendered as a result of the legislation itself, 
and he became an active participant in rights-identity through "its 
context-creating effects."85 
79 Id. at 97. At the same time, the authors generally subscribe both to classical rights 
theory and the rights versus relationship model in that they see legal rights as having 
both positive and negative effects on identity. Id. at 86. 
80 See id. at 87. 
81 See id. 
82Id. at 97. 
83 Id. at 116-22. 
84Id. at 102. 
85 Id; cf. Peter Blanck, Civil War Pensions and Disability, 62 Ohio St. L.J. 109 (2001) 
(identifying historical, political, and social forces behind the conceptions of disability); 
Peter David Blanck & Michael Millender, Before Disability Civil Rights: Civil War 
Pensions and the Politics of Disability in America, 52 Ala. L. Rev. 1 (2000) (same). 
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Thus, Barry believes that the importance of the ADA is not in 
its formal invocation, but in the way its very existence transforms 
society, people, and their relationships.86 In contrast, Raymond 
Militello, who has a learning disability, sees himself as abnormal 
and thus he sees the ADA as wrongfully preferring abnormality to 
normalcy.87 While he appreciates the more positive accommoda- 
tions he has received in college, Raymond hesitates to view himself 
as a "rights-bearer," instead envisioning himself as a wily person 
taking advantage of any means to get in the "back door" and gain 
advantage over his peers.88 Moreover, Raymond explicitly (and 
ironically) opposes the ADA as an unnecessary governmental in- 
trusion into the private sphere. He questions whether all those who 
make use of the ADA, including himself, really need it.89 
Accordingly, Rights of Inclusion asserts that because current 
rights theory in its three major iterations fails to fully account for 
the effects of the ADA on persons with disabilities, a new, more 
appropriate rights theory is necessary. This paradigm would take 
into account the facts that rights (1) become active in informal, ex- 
tralegal ways; (2) are active when they transform the self- 
perception of the rights-holder; (3) produce cultural and discursive 
shifts that impact the way that rights-holders view themselves and 
how others view them; and (4) create new contexts that alter the 
identities of rights-holders.0 As well, the impact of rights must be 
viewed over time since temporal depth is necessary for a meaning- 
ful analysis of the effect that rights engender.91 
The most crucial elements of Engel and Munger's framework 
are a recognition of the centrality of work to adult identity and the 
manner in which employment confers moral citizenship.92 Unem- 
ployed people are marginalized and viewed as less than working 
adults, resulting in a lessening of self-respect. Since, historically, 
"disability" is a term associated with an inability to work, persons 
with disabilities that hinder employment are threatened with a 
86 
Engel & Munger, supra note 15, at 103. 
87Id. at 75. 
88Id. at 74-77. 
89 Id. at 75-77. 90 Id. at 94-96. 91 See id. at 98-104. 
92 Id. at 116. 
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lessening of self-respect, self-sufficiency, and self-reliance.93 Conse- 
quently, for people with disabilities, work is the ability "to achieve 
recognition as independent and worthy participants in society."94 
The assertion of the necessity for a new rights theory is demon- 
strated by Engel and Munger's description of three common dis- 
courses of rights95 they found among interviewees: the market,96 re- 
ligion,97 and racial justice.98 Because dialectic impacts the way in 
which disability, rights, and identity interact, Engel and Munger 
maintain that providing a new rights theory framework creates a 
method to understand and evaluate experience.9 Sid Tegler's ex- 
perience, for example, demonstrates the marketplace discourse.?? 
Sid uses a cost-benefit approach to rights under the ADA to dis- 
tance himself from his disability and the social stigma inherent in it 
because he needs to view himself as being as capable an employee 
as anyone else. Thus, he cannot support accommodation provisions 
under the ADA without compromising his identity.10' The dis- 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 117; see also id. at 116-22. 95 They describe the term "discourse" as being, 
by definition, interactive and intersubjective. It is the communicative medium 
through which the self interacts with and comes to be distributed among others, 
thereby establishing a sense of identity. Further, because a discourse is a way of 
thinking and talking about experiences, narrations of the self continually draw 
on available discourses to create and recreate identity. 
Id. at 143. These various "discourses," as the authors term them, fundamentally af- 
fected how the interviewees responded to and interacted with the ADA: "If potential 
rights holders cannot articulate a disparity between the treatment expected and the 
treatment actually received, they may come to accept as natural and appropriate what 
might otherwise be considered exclusion or discrimination. They can perceive no 
space within which ADA rights could become active." Id. at 144. 
96 This discourse ties into how persons with disabilities construct their identities as 
employees, specifically in relation to notions of cost-benefit and reasonableness. Id. at 
152-53. 
97 By which the authors mean "a resource that enables [the interviewees] to under- 
stand and express their concepts of self, disability, employment, and the law." Id. at 
159. 
98 This term describes "the use of concepts and language that are widely shared in 
our society as Americans talk-and sometimes heatedly disagree-about fairness and 
justice for racial minorities." Id. at 144-45. 99 Interestingly, they found all three discourses present and effective amongst the 
interviewees. Id. at 165-67. 
?00 Id. at 153-56; see also id. at 106-32. 
101 Id. at 153-55. Additionally, the authors note that when confronted with discrimi- 
nation, "Sid's approach... was to express his disdain and move on." Id. at 109. Sid 
1168 [Vol. 90:1151 
Under the Empirical Radar 
course of the market, then, protects his identity as a capable 
worker.102 
The discourse of faith can be seen in the life story of Georgia 
Steeb, who is conflicted between her Christian duty to forgive 
rights-violators and her role as a rights-bearer. In theory, Georgia 
believes she should assert her rights when they are violated, but 
she also believes that her Christian faith requires that she turn the 
other cheek. As a result, Georgia can pursue only the most egre- 
gious violations, in accordance with her faith.103 
The discourse of racial justice can be seen in the circumstance of 
Ron Zander, who equates the ADA's reasonable accommodations 
provisions with affirmative action. In so doing, he distinguishes, 
somewhat hazily, between "discrimination" that he considers to be 
legally allowable, refusal of preferential treatment (specifically, a 
refusal to extend more time to dyslexics to deal with job-related 
paperwork), and "prejudice" that is not legally allowable (for in- 
stance, refusing to hire someone like himself due to dyslexia). The 
more closely analogous to race-based discrimination an employer's 
action is, the more Ron thinks it should be illegal.04 
II. EXPRESSIVE LAW SCHOLARSHIP 
Expressive law scholarship examines the impact that the external 
(the legal system) can have on the internal (individual behavior) by 
altering social norms. This is an aspect of rights transformation not 
addressed in Rights of Inclusion. Alex Geisinger's "belief change" 
theory offers a gloss on expressive law scholarship that explains 
how those changes can be positive and predictive. 
eventually became self-employed. Id. at 110. Speaking of employers, customers, and 
clients, Sid believes them to be indifferent, rather than hostile, to people with disabili- 
ties, and thinks that they will not care about disabilities when they are convinced that 
working with someone is in their financial interest. Id. at 112-13. 102 Id. at 153-56. 
103 Id. at 159-63. 04 Id. at 149-51; cf. Samuel R. Bagenstos, "Rational Discrimination," Accommoda- 
tion, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 Va. L. Rev. 825, 833-37 (2003) 
(arguing that discrimination against the disabled is as morally reprehensible as racial 
discrimination). 
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A. The Goals of Expressive Law Scholarship 
Traditional law and economics literature operates from the prem- 
ise that people act rationally to maximize their own utility when 
choosing among alternatively available courses of conduct.105 Under 
this framework, known as rational choice theory, law operates by 
varying the cost to an individual of satisfying her exogenous prefer- 
ences through the use of sanctions.06 For any given activity, increas- 
ing the associated cost will decrease that individual's desire to choose 
that opportunity; conversely, a decrease in cost will encourage the 
individual to satisfy her desire by choosing that opportunity.107 In 
other words, manipulating the opportunity set available to a given ac- 
tor will alter her subsequent choices. 
This standard economic account has proved a useful baseline 
method for modeling human behavior and thereby predicting the ef- 
fects of particular policies.'08 Scholars who have challenged the tradi- 
tional model have done so primarily on two grounds.'0 Those exter- 
105 See William J. Baumol & Alan S. Blinder, Economics: Principles and Policy 99- 
103 (8th ed. 1999); Mark Perlman & Charles R. McCann, Jr., The Pillars of Economic 
Understanding: Factors and Markets 301 (2000) (describing the market as a "model of 
allocative efficiency"). 
'06 "In the vision of law that dominates economics-influenced legal theory, law im- 
poses sanctions to solve problems ...." Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory 
of Expressive Law, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1649, 1650 (2000). Professor McAdams uses this 
axiom as a departure point for his version of expressive law theory. 
107 For a discussion of this point made in the context of criminal activity, see Ken- 
neth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference- 
Shaping Policy, 1990 Duke L.J. 1. 
08 Two Nobel laureates unabashedly defend this model from the perspective that 
preferences are relatively static and that studying variable taste is a futile endeavor. 
See George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, Am. 
Econ. Rev., Mar. 1977, at 76. 
109 Two other challenges that do not originate from questioning the rationality of behav- 
ioral constraints are nonetheless worth mentioning. The first is feminist law and econom- 
ics, notably the work of Professor Hadfield. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, Households 
at Work: Beyond Labor Market Policies to Remedy the Gender Gap, 82 Geo. L.J. 89, 
89-90 (1993) (challenging the circular reasoning used by those law and economics 
scholars who explain gender wage differentials by reference to the historical house- 
hold structure without also questioning the existence of this arrangement); Gillian K. 
Hadfield, Flirting with Science: Richard Posner on the Bioeconomics of Sexual Man, 
106 Harv. L. Rev. 479, 502-03 (1992) (reviewing Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason 
(1992)). The second is environmental aw and economics. See generally Daniel H. 
Cole, Environmental Protection and Economic Growth: Lessons from Socialist 
Europe, in Law and Economics: New and Critical Perspectives 295 (Robin Paul 
Malloy & Christopher K. Braun eds., 1995) (tracing the comparative failure of envi- 
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nal to the discipline of law and economics have faulted it on the basis 
that the framework assumes rational behavior and is therefore either 
methodologically deficient'10 or morally wanting.11 
By contrast, commentators generally satisfied with the law and 
economic schema, but wishing to extend and add greater nuance to 
its reach, have advocated for greater exploration into how law shapes 
choices beyond the use of traditional sanctions. Typically this is 
achieved either by changing the social meaning of a behavior, and 
thus the likelihood of being socially sanctioned for undertaking that 
behavior, or by altering individual preference so that people no 
longer desire to satisfy a particular taste.12 Both emendations result 
in individuals choosing a previously secondary course of conduct. 
This scholarly agenda, which generally may be referred to as the field 
ronmental protection in socialist Europe); Jeff L. Lewin, Toward a New Ecological 
Law & Economics, in Law and Economics: New and Critical Perspectives, supra, at 
249, 250 (suggesting "the emergence of a new 'ecological law & economics' that will 
address such issues as ecological scarcity and environmental equity from a perspective 
that overcomes the limitations of the neoclassical approach"). 
"0 For two early criticisms, see Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production 
Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. Cal. L. Rev. 669 (1979) and Dun- 
can Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 Stan. L. 
Rev. 387 (1981). As an aside, the traditional law and economics academy acknowl- 
edges that not all behavior is rational and, therefore, accountable by the traditional 
model. See, e.g., The Law and Economics of Irrational Behavior (Francesco Parisi & 
Vernon Smith eds., forthcoming 2004) (exploring models of irrational behavior and 
the implications for the design of legal rules and institutions); Robert E. Scott, The 
Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1603 (2000) 
(noting some of the limitations). 111 See, e.g., Henry S. Richardson, The Stupidity of the Cost-Benefit Standard, in 
Cost-Benefit Analysis: Legal, Economic, and Philosophical Perspectives 135 (Mat- 
thew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 2001) (questioning the validity of the entire ra- 
tional economic model); Martha C. Nussbaum, The Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral 
Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. Legal Stud. 1005, 1007-08 (2000). 
112 Lawrence Lessig describes this schism as one between the "Old Chicago School," 
whose adherents believe that norms act independently of law, and the "New Chicago 
School," whose adherents consider what impact laws have upon norms. Lawrence Lessig, 
The New Chicago School, 27 J. Legal Stud. 661, 673-80 (1998). For stalwarts of the Old 
Chicago School-for example, Judge Richard Posner-law and social norms scholarship 
enriches traditional law and economic work, but does not supercede it. Specifically, Judge 
Posner believes that social meaning is "something that comes ready-made in the sound or 
gesture or practice," but is not itself instilled into an act by law. See Richard A. Posner, 
Social Norms, Social Meaning, and Economic Analysis of Law: A Comment, 27 J. Legal 
Stud. 553, 563 (1998). 
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of law and social norms,11 has inspired an outpouring of behavioral 
economic scholarship11 examining the effect of law and norms on a 
range of individual behavior beyond the traditional effect of sanc- 
tions."15 
113 Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (1991), 
is considered by many to be the determining work in the general field of law and so- 
cial norms and therefore the wellspring of much of what followed. See, e.g., Richard 
H. McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates: Laws, Norms, and Economic Methodology, 
110 Yale L.J. 625, 626 (2001) (reviewing Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms 
(2000)) (opining that "[t]he seminal work in the law-and-economics camp is unques- 
tionably Robert Ellickson's"). According to McAdams, Posner's 2000 work "repre- 
sents the first book-length treatment of this subject by a law professor since Ellick- 
son." Id. Several symposia have been convened on the subject. For example, see 
Symposium, Law, Economics, & Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1643 (1996); Symposium, 
The Legal Construction of Norms, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1577 (2000); Symposium, Social 
Norms, Social Meaning, and the Economic Analysis of Law, 27 J. Legal Stud. 537 
(1998). A cogent overview of this scholarship is provided by Robert C. Ellickson, The 
Evolution of Social Norms: A Perspective from the Legal Academy, in Social Norms 
35 (Michael Hechter & Karl-Dieter Opp eds., 2001). 1 See generally Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Econom- 
ics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471 (1998) (envisioning how law and economics analysis may be 
improved by attention to insight about actual human behavior); Russell Korobkin, 
Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power of Default 
Rules and Form Terms, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1583, 1584-88 (1998) (analyzing the impact 
on contract negotiations of negotiator biases for the status quo and inaction, as well as 
expressive law and economics (which examines how legal norms can alter social norms)). 
Referring to themselves as "the radical middle," these last scholars are represented by 
their own section in the American Association of Law Schools and contribute to the 
publication of the Journal of Socio-Economics. 
15 See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual 
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. Legal Stud. 115 (1992) (diamond mer- 
chants); Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages, Social Norms, and Economic Analysis, 
60 Law & Contemp. Probs. 73 (1997) (punitive damages); Robert D. Cooter, 
Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralized Law, 
14 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 215 (1994) (commercial law); Melvin A. Eisenberg, 
Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1253 (1999) (corporate law); 
Steven Hetcher, Creating Safe Social Norms in a Dangerous World, 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
1 (1999) (torts); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 591 (1996) (criminal punishment); Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Con- 
flict: The Economics of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1003 (1995) (antidiscrimination law); Richard H. McAdams, Group Norms, 
Gossip, and Blackmail, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2237 (1996) (blackmail); Eric A. Posner, 
Family Law and Social Norms, in The Fall and Rise of Freedom of Contract 256 (F. 
H. Buckley ed., 1999) (family law); Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case 
of Tax Compliance, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1781 (2000) (tax); Eric A. Posner, The Legal 
Regulation of Religious Groups, 2 Legal Theory 33 (1996) (religion); Elizabeth S. 
Scott & Robert E. Scott, A Contract Theory of Marriage, in The Fall and Rise of 
Freedom of Contract, supra, at 201 (marriage); Michelle J. White, Why It Pays to File 
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A recent branch of law and social norms scholarship is the related 
area of expressive law, which seeks to understand law's potential for 
proscribing or changing the social significance of particular behavior 
to individuals, thereby altering their behavior."6 This is because the 
new law either carries a symbolic social meaning, or because it affects 
the way individuals mediate that symbolic social meaning.l7 What is 
crucial to this analysis is the nexus between law, norms, and social 
meaning. When designed appropriately, law can cause individuals to 
alter their own behavior because either the law induces them to 
change their tastes (internalization), or creates a fear of bearing so- 
cial sanctions (second order sanctions), or because of pressure 
brought to bear upon them through societal sanction (third order 
sanctions)."8 
An example commonly used in the literature to illustrate the effect 
of norm changes on behavior is regulations prohibiting public smok- 
ing.119 Suppose a society exists in which most people smoke regularly, 
for Bankruptcy: A Critical Look at the Incentives Under U.S. Personal Bankruptcy 
Law and a Proposal for Change, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 685 (1998) (bankruptcy). 116 See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. Legal Stud. 585 
(1998) (describing the role of law in the development of social norms, and socioeco- 
nomic law and economics, which seeks to inject psychological and social factors related to 
wealth and race into otherwise "neutral" economic analyses); Lawrence Lessig, The 
Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 943 (1995) (examining the social con- 
struction of orthodoxy and its place in the law); McAdams, supra note 106 (suggesting 
that law may be alternatively conceptualized for its expressive, as well as its tradition- 
ally acknowledged, enforcement functions); Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal 
Theory of Expressive Law, 79 Or. L. Rev. 339 (2000) (highlighting the power of the 
approval or disapproval of law in shaping behavior); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expres- 
sive Function of Law, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2021 (1996) (considering how legal statements 
might be designed to change social norms). 
117 Lessig, supra note 112, at 681-83. 
8 This account is, naturally enough for an emerging field, a synthesis of several 
views rather than a univocal proposition. For example, Robert Cooter describes law 
as having two very different functions: enacting new obligations from the top down 
(as in the case of regulatory law), or growing from the bottom up (through social 
norm enforcement). See Robert Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 Cor- 
nell L. Rev. 947, 947-49 (1997). I conflate Cooter's two functions in this Review be- 
cause I see them as complementary rather than as dichotomous. For a comprehensive 
literature review of the development of the field and the nuances contained therein, 
see Geisinger, supra note 22. 
119 See, e.g., Geisinger, supra note 22, at 44-48; McAdams, supra note 106, at 1718-21; 
Sunstein, supra note 116, at 2032-34; Richard H. McAdams & Janice Nadler, A Third 
Model of Legal Compliance: Testing for Expressive Effects in a Hawk/Dove Game, 
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either because they consider it pleasurable or it is otherwise in keep- 
ing with regular social mores. Having learned that smoking engen- 
ders both health care costs (cancer and emphysema, to name two ex- 
amples) and environmental costs (poor air quality), the legislature 
passes a law that prohibits public smoking and fines violators.20 The 
effect of this statute on Marlboro Man, an exuberant smoker, can be 
threefold. Passage of the anti-smoking ordinance can (1) educate 
Marlboro Man that smoking really is a bad activity in which to en- 
gage, not only for himself, but also for fellow citizens within reach of 
second-hand smoke and for animals who may choke on cigarette 
butts, and so change his desire to smoke; or (2) have no affect at all 
on Marlboro Man's personal desire to smoke, but result in fear of so- 
cial condemnation from others who witness his public smoking caus- 
ing him either to curb his addiction or to practice it in private; and/or, 
in combination with either or both of the previous two possibilities, 
(3) cause other members of Marlboro Man's society to bear social 
pressure and condemnation upon him until he abstains from public 
smoking.12 
B. Alex Geisinger's "Belief Change" Theory 
Some law and economics scholars have criticized the account of 
law's effect upon norm change contained in expressive law as being 
descriptive and lacking predictive effect.22 There are also scholars 
who have raised questions about whether law itself can even have an 
expressive effect in internalizing normative value choices.'23 
The John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working 
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 285, at http://lsr.nellco.org/yale/lepp/papers/285. 
The role of the legislature in signaling preferences and endorsing certain out- 
comes is part of Richard McAdams's continuing and intrepid scholarship on expres- 
sive law. See, e.g., McAdams & Nadler, supra note 119; Dhammika Dharmapala & 
Richard H. McAdams, The Condorcet Jury Theorem and the Expressive Function of 
Law: A Theory of Informative Law, 5 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 1 (2003). 
121 For examples in the literature, see Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming 
White Collar Criminals: A Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 
42 J.L. & Econ. 365, 366 (1999) (criminal shaming) and Lessig, supra note 116, at 971 
(dueling). 
122 See, e.g., Scott, supra note 110, at 1606-07; Stigler & Becker, supra note 108, at 
81-83. 
123 See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1363 (2000); Matthew D. Adler, Linguistic Meaning, Nonlinguistic "Ex- 
pression," and the Multiple Variants of Expressivism: A Reply to Professors Anderson 
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In response to these valid criticisms, Alex Geisinger has proffered 
a "belief change" theory of expressive law that seeks to model and 
predict behavior in the context of social norm change.24 Drawing on 
studies by social psychologists, he points out that two factors mainly 
influence individual decisions as to whether to engage in particular 
behavior: the individual's attitude towards the behavior, and the in- 
dividual's belief about how society at large views that behavior.'25 
Combined, these two factors help determine how an individual will 
act in a given circumstance; in other words, a person's attitude (or be- 
lief certainty) about the consequences of satisfying a particular pref- 
erence will govern whether she will satisfy that preference.'26 
According to Geisinger, law impacts an individual's certainty re- 
garding the consequences of her actions either by providing addi- 
tional information about that action (for instance, informing Marl- 
boro Man that smoking causes lung cancer), or through its influence 
on an individual's "inferential reasoning process" (for example, that 
despite lobbying by the tobacco industry, which funds many of the 
representatives' election campaigns, the legislature nonetheless bans 
public smoking).'27 This change in belief may occur because people 
were ambivalent about particular conduct, and the law's passage has 
now "tipped" those fence-sitters towards an equilibrium (Marlboro 
Man had heard that smoking was unhealthy, but was as yet uncon- 
vinced), or because individuals with little information regarding an 
activity have now updated their knowledge and beliefs subsequent to 
the law's passage (that is, all of Marlboro Man's friends smoked, and 
none had cancer, but a larger empirical data set has now been pro- 
vided).28 
Similarly, passage of a law will provide information to Marlboro 
Man on the likelihood of being socially sanctioned. Marlboro Man 
and Pildes, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1577 (2000); Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, 
Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1503 (2000). 
See Geisinger, supra note 22. 125 Id. at 55-56; see also Martin Fishbein & Icek Ajzen, Belief, Attitude, Intention 
and Behavior: An Introduction to Theory and Research 13-18 (1975) (outlining a 
conceptual framework that suggests that the performance or nonperformance of a 
specific behavior is determined by the person's intention to perform that behavior). 
126 Geisinger, supra note 22, at 56, 62-63; see also Russell Veitch & Daniel Arkkelin, 
Environmental Psychology: An Interdisciplinary Perspective 109 (1995) (discussing 
the Fishbein-Ajzen "Reasoned Action Model" of behavior). 
127 Geisinger, supra note 22, at 63-65. 128 Id. at 68-69. 
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may believe that he is more likely to be sanctioned for smoking be- 
cause people have a general belief that laws should be followed. In 
addition, as Professors Richard McAdams and Robert Scott have 
each pointed out, the fact that a legislature has passed the anti- 
smoking ordinance provides information to individuals (especially in 
light of the costs to legislators personally) that the majority of the 
electorate believes the rule is just.'29 Thus, a belief change theory rests 
on the mechanisms through which a law's passage will influence an 
individual's behavior beyond the traditional notion of sanction.'30 
Moreover, Geisinger explains that a belief change theory clarifies 
the process of internalization, and its attendant effect upon subjective 
norms, in a more complete manner than previous scholarship. This is 
because internalization comes about as the result of law impacting at- 
titude, rather than stimulating the subjective norm."3 Returning once 
more to the hypothetical Marlboro Man, he is initially surprised by 
the passage of the anti-smoking law because he knows that the legis- 
lators are either smokers or are heavily supported by tobacco-based 
campaign funds. Ultimately, however, he infers from passage of the 
law that smoking must indeed be a hazardous activity and changes 
his attitude regarding smoking in public. Henceforth, not only does 
Marlboro Man refrain from public smoking, but he also castigates 
fellow smokers when he catches them lighting up in public. This cir- 
cumstance arises because Marlboro Man has internalized his prefer- 
ence change due to passage of the anti-smoking ordinance. Should he 
feel compelled to smoke in public due to a nicotine addiction, he 
129 McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, supra note 116, at 362-63; 
Scott, supra note 110, at 1624-25. Geisinger asserts that, while basically correct, nei- 
ther of these explanations is as fully satisfactory as his belief change theory, since ma- 
joritarian compliance is "only one form of inferential belief change regarding the sub- 
jective norm." Geisinger, supra note 22, at 70. 130 This is because: 
Passage of a law will likely affect attitudes toward the behavior by increasing or 
decreasing the certainty with which beliefs regarding a behavior are held. Pas- 
sage of a law may also affect an individual's belief about the subjective norm, 
thus increasing or decreasing the likelihood that the individual will undertake 
the behavior. Furthermore, the effects on belief certainty about a particular be- 
havior or the subjective norm are measurable and can be combined in a mean- 
ingful way to predict the outcome of such changes on an individual's intent to 
undertake a behavior. The belief change theory, therefore, provides a compre- 
hensive and predictable means of analyzing the non-sanctioning effects of a law. 
Geisinger, supra note 22, at 65. 131 Id. at 66-67. 
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would feel guilty about doing so even if no one was around to ob- 
serve him.132 
Nor is this phenomenon, according to Geisinger's model, merely 
an instance of a belief change occurring while a preference remains 
the same (that is, that Marlboro Man now recognizes the dangers of 
smoking but only acts as he does in order to avoid second and third 
order sanctions). This is because Marlboro Man now derives greater 
utility from not smoking, or from stopping others from smoking, than 
he does from smoking or by remaining silent. As such, law may not 
only provide greater information about given activities, it may also 
act to change individuals' internal beliefs about the consequences of 
those activities.'33 Consequently, Geisinger's belief change theory 
"accounts for changes in social meaning by suggesting that, at a par- 
ticular point, law increases the certainty of particular beliefs about an 
activity while decreasing other beliefs about it."134 
III. DISABILITY RIGHTS: NORMS AND ASPIRATIONS 
Extant socio-legal norms on disability rights view people with 
disabilities as being inherently less capable than non-disabled peo- 
ple. In consequence, society views disability-related rights as "spe- 
cial" rights. These notions can be seen in recent Supreme Court 
decisions. By contrast, the ADA seeks to eliminate artificial barri- 
ers to disabled participation and recognizes the equality of the dis- 
abled. This Part contrasts social and legal conventions regarding 
people with disabilities to the aspirations set forth in the ADA. 
A. Existing Socio-Legal Norms on Disability Rights 
Social convention equates disabled people's biological atypical- 
ity with inherent lesser ability. In consequence, prevailing socio- 
legal norms view disability rights as special rights. These views, 
which combine to exclude people with disabilities from equal social 
participation, can be seen in recent Supreme Court opinions. 
132This hypothetical parallels the example provided initially by Scott, supra note 
110, at 1608, and elaborated on by Geisinger, supra note 22, at 51, which uses devoted 
dog lovers. 
Geisinger, supra note 22, at 68-70. 134 Id. at 72. 
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1. Inherent Lesser Ability 
A primary social convention regarding people with disabilities is 
one that equates their biological atypicality with inherent lesser 
ability. Perhaps the most damaging aspect of this concept, expressed 
in sociological terms, is the belief that people with disabilities are 
"inauthentic workers."'35 
Set against the backdrop of public policies that presume people 
with disabilities can and should receive public assistance rather than 
engage in employment,36 this perception justifies the disadvantaged 
socioeconomic position of workers with disabilities who are em- 
ployed in lower paying or less demanding positions.'37 This is a per- 
ception that the Court has implicitly endorsed. In Cleveland v. Pol- 
icy Management System Corp., 38 plaintiff Cleveland was deemed to 
have ADA protection in retaining employment, even though she 
had exercised a statutory entitlement to Social Security Disability 
Insurance ("SSDI") benefits. The burden shifted to her, however, 
to show that with reasonable accommodation she could overcome 
the crucial aspects of the employment-related dysfunction on 
which her SSDI application was based.39 Thus, the Court preserved 
the principle that an assignment to the disability classification car- 
ries a presumption of inability, and continued to expect individuals 
so classified to prove themselves exceptions to this presumption in 
135 The phrase is drawn from Schultz, supra note 5, at 1892. 
136 Defining someone as disabled under the Social Security system "incorporates 
common expectations and shared values about what infirmities a person ought not to 
have to bear and keep working." Lance Liebman, The Definition of Disability in So- 
cial Security and Supplemental Security Income: Drawing the Bounds of Social Wel- 
fare Estates, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 833, 853 (1976). See generally Harlan Hahn, Accom- 
modations and the ADA: Unreasonable Bias or Biased Reasoning?, 21 Berkeley J. 
Emp. & Lab. L. 166, 183-85 (2000) (characterizing the development of Social Security 
Insurance ("SSI") and SSDI under the Nixon administration as one intended to keep 
disabled people out of the workplace); Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, Disabil- 
ity, Equal Protection, and the Supreme Court: Standing at the Crossroads of Progres- 
sive and Retrogressive Logic in Constitutional Classification, 35 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 
81, 124-25 (2002) (referencing "welfarist" policies that presume people with disabili- 
ties will not engage in employment opportunity). 
137 In describing the parallel position of women, Schultz points out the odd position 
taken by Professor Becker, who maintains that women are occupationally disadvan- 
taged because of their "comparative advantage" at child care and housework. See 
Schultz, supra note 5, at 1893-98. 
138 526 U.S. 795 (1999). 139 Id. at 798. 
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order to gain access to the normal opportunity range, including 
employment.'4 
2. Special Rights 
Because socio-legal norms operate from the premise that dis- 
abled workers are less capable than their non-disabled peers, an at- 
tendant social convention is that disability rights are special 
rights.'14 As a result, provisions that integrate people with disabili- 
ties into the workplace are perceived of as raising those individuals 
above an equality equilibrium, rather than leveling an uneven play- 
ing field.142 
This perspective is aptly demonstrated by the Supreme Court's 
opinion in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. 
Garrett.143 Patricia Garrett sued the University after being demoted 
from her nursing supervisor position because she had undergone 
breast cancer treatment.44 The Court did not reach the merits of 
her claim, ruling that as a state actor the defendant was immune 
from Garrett's private ADA suit for monetary damages.'45 None- 
theless, Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion upheld as con- 
stitutional state workplace practices discriminating against people 
with disabilities for inherent economic reasons.'46 This is because 
"it would be entirely rational" for state employers "to conserve 
scarce financial resources by hiring employees who are able to use 
existing facilities" rather than comply with ADA requests.47 Ac- 
140 Id.; cf. Barnhart v. Thomas, 124 S. Ct. 376 (2003) (holding that people are not dis- 
abled for social security purposes if they are functionally capable of some type of em- 
ployment, even if the position they once held is either terminated or no longer exists 
in the national economy). 
141 See Peter J. Rubin, Equal Rights, Special Rights, and the Nature of Antidiscrimi- 
nation Law, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 564, 565 (1998) (noting that categorizing rights as special 
rights "conflate[s] antidiscrimination laws that essentially mirror the Constitution's 
own command with affirmative action provisions whose constitutionality can be de- 
termined under current law only after they have been subjected to searching judicial 
scrutiny"). 
142 address this perspective, which has become canonical in the legal literature, in 
Stein, supra note 28. 
143 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 144 Id. at 362. 
'45 Id. at 360. 
146 Id. at 369-72. 
147 Id. at 372. 
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cordingly, state actors "could quite hardheadedly-and perhaps 
hardheartedly-hold to job-qualification requirements which do 
not make allowance for the disabled."'48 Although Garrett did not 
request any form of accommodation, the Chief Justice character- 
ized her ADA claims as being for "special accommodations."'49 
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment, noting that the adjudi- 
cation of ADA claims was not an equality issue.50 Rather, that de- 
termination necessitated an internal battle between "our own hu- 
man instincts" which cause us to shun disabled people, and "the 
better angels of our nature" that sympathize for "those disadvan- 
taged by mental or physical impairments."'15 Hence, according to 
the Court's ruling, ADA rights involve something more than 
equality, and are motivated by humanitarian concerns rather than 
a belief in the equality of the disabled.152 
B. ADA Disability Rights Aspirations 
Among the ADA's normative aspirations were the elimination of 
artificial barriers to disabled persons' equal participation in society 
and a concurrent social recognition of their civil rights.'53 
'48Id. at 367-8. 
149 Id. at 368. 
150Justice Kennedy was joined by Justice O'Connor. Id. at 374-75. (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 151 Id. at 375-76. 
152 In contrast to the majority, Justice Breyer dissented on the ground that "Con- 
gress compiled a vast legislative record" which documented extensive and "powerful 
evidence of discriminatory treatment" of the disabled that both "implicate[d] state 
governments" and supported the rights-based theory evoked by the plaintiffs. Id. at 
377-78 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 153 The qualification reflects the fact that numerous interpretations are possible. For 
example, Professor Samuel Bagenstos has offered four distinct analyses of the princi- 
ples that either underlie or ought to motivate ADA jurisprudence. First, the ADA 
could be seen as by and large extending protection only to those individuals subject to 
stigma and systematic disadvantage. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, 
Stigma, and "Disability," 86 Va. L. Rev. 397, 401 (2000). Second, the statute can be 
viewed through the lens of risk regulation. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans 
with Disabilities Act as Risk Regulation, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1479 (2001). Third, the 
ADA was "sold" to Congress on the notion of making disabled people independent 
of public assistance. See Bagenstos, supra note 6, at 953-75. Fourth, the legislation 
was intended, by means of moral imperative, to remedy discrimination. See Bagen- 
stos, supra note 104, at 837-46. For a diverse treatment of the issue of disability iden- 
tity formation, see Symposium, Disability & Identity, 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 907 
(2003). 
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1. Eliminating Artificial Barriers 
During hearings on the ADA, Congress was presented with a 
catalog of evidence on the historical exclusion of people with dis- 
abilities from American society.54 Among the more dramatic evi- 
dence presented were results of an independent nationwide poll of 
one thousand Americans with disabilitiess55 that found that two- 
thirds of working-age people with disabilities were unemployed,'56 
and that two-thirds of those individuals wanted to work but could 
not do so because of employer attitudes.'57 The study also found 
that during the year prior to the ADA hearings nearly two-thirds 
of individuals with disabilities did not attend movies;'58 three- 
fourths of the disabled population did not see live theatrical or mu- 
sical performances;l59 two-thirds of disabled people had not at- 
tended sporting events;'60 seventeen percent did not eat in restau- 
rants; 161 and thirteen percent had not shopped in grocery stores.'62 
154 Congress summarized its conclusions as to this evidence in the ADA's Findings 
section. 42 U.S.C. ? 12101 (2000); Moreover, "[h]istorically, society has tended to iso- 
late and segregate handicapped people. Despite some improvements... discrimina- 
tion against handicapped persons continues to be a serious and pervasive social prob- 
lem." U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, Accommodating the Spectrum of Individual 
Abilities 159 (1983). 155 Louis Harris & Associates, Inc., The International Center for the Disabled Sur- 
vey of Disabled Americans: Bringing Disabled Americans into the Mainstream (1986) 
[hereinafter Harris/ICD Survey]. These results were summarized to Congress by the 
President of that organization during hearings on the ADA. See Guaranteed Job Op- 
portunity Act of 1987: Joint Hearing on S. 777 Before the Subcomm. on Employment 
and Productivity and Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Sen. Comm. on Labor 
and Human Resources, 100th Cong., at 9 (1987) (statement of Humphrey Taylor, 
President, Louis Harris & Associates, Inc.) (cited in S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 8 (1989)). 
For a thorough overview of the ADA by one of its drafters, see Robert L. Burgdorf, 
Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second- 
Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 413, 441-58 (1991). For a 
good journalistic account, see Joseph P. Shapiro, No Pity: People with Disabilities 
Forging a New Civil Rights Movement 105-41 (1993). 
156 Harris/ICD Survey, supra note 155, at 47. 157 Id. at 50-51. 
58 Id. at 37, 39. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 40. 
162 Id. at 39. 
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These findings were corroborated both with more empirically rig- 
orous evidence'63 and with anecdotal evidence.16 
As a result of those hearings, Congress was persuaded that the 
overall status of disabled people in America was a dismal one, con- 
cluding that disabled Americans have historically been "relegated 
to a position of political powerlessness in our society,"'65 and "con- 
tinually encounter various forms of discrimination."' Conse- 
quently, the legislators found that people with disabilities have 
been denied equal opportunities in society, including employment, 
education, transportation, access to public services, and voting.'67 
Congress, moreover, identified the source of this exclusion as an 
artificial one, sustained by the "continuing existence of unfair and 
unnecessary discrimination and prejudice."'6 Among the forms of 
unnecessary exclusion encountered by people with disabilities on a 
daily basis, Congress noted "the discriminatory effects of architec- 
tural, transportation, and communication barriers."'69 
Accordingly, Congress premised the ADA on the belief that the 
repercussions of having a disability are often mutable and can be 
relieved when the social environment accommodates physical and 
163 For example, census data indicated at that time that more than twenty percent of 
working age individuals with disabilities were below the poverty level. National 
Council on the Handicapped, Toward Independence 5 (1986). Previous testimony be- 
fore the Senate had concluded that "by almost any definition... disabled Americans 
are uniquely underprivileged and disadvantaged. They are much poorer, much less 
well educated and, having much less social life, enjoy fewer amenities and have a 
lower level of life satisfaction than other Americans." Guaranteed Job Opportunity 
Act of 1987: Joint Hearing on S. 777, supra note 155, at 9. 64 The more compelling anecdotal evidence included the following: testimony by a 
wheelchair-using future undersecretary of the Department of Education who was re- 
moved from an auction house for being deemed "disgusting to look at"; testimony 
about individuals with Down Syndrome who were banned from a zoo because of the 
keeper's fear they would frighten the chimpanzees; testimony that an academically 
competitive and nondisruptive child was barred from attending public school because 
of a teacher's allegation that his physical appearance "produced a nauseating effect" 
upon classmates; and testimony about a competent arthritic woman who was denied a 
job by a college because of its trustees' belief that "normal students shouldn't see 
her." S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 6-8 (1989). 165 42 U.S.C. ? 12101(a)(7) (2000). 
66 Id. ? 12101(a)(5). 167 Id. ? 12101(a)(3). 
68 Id. ? 12101(a)(9). 
169 Id. ? 12101(a)(5). 
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cognitive difference instead of excluding it.'70 By recognizing that 
many disadvantages associated with disability are the result of so- 
cial construct rather than biological destiny, the ADA seeks to 
eliminate an environment that is artificially hostile to those im- 
pairments."7 
2. Recognizing Equality 
Policymakers considering how to rectify historical inequities, 
whether motivated by reasons of equality or by a desire to redis- 
tribute social resources, are normally faced with choosing between 
the options of regulation (for example, antidiscrimination legisla- 
tion) and tax-and-spend (also called subsidy) programs.'72 Indeed, 
several commentators have advocated for subsidies in lieu of the 
ADA's mandates as a way of providing employers with incentives 
to accommodate and retain workers with disabilities.173 
170 See Silvers & Stein, supra note 136, at 89-98. 
171 As such, it is fair to say that the ADA comports with the social model of disability 
that is asserted by most Disability Studies commentators. See Liachowitz, supra note 
28; Scotch, supra note 28; Wendell, supra note 28; Amundson, supra note 28. 172 See generally Mark Kelman, Strategy or Principle? The Choice between Regula- 
tion and Taxation 81-94 (1999) (exploring the relationship between regulation and 
cost-bearing burdens); Robert Howse, Retrenchment, Reform or Revolution? The 
Shift to Incentives and the Future of the Regulatory State, in Regulation, Economics 
and the Law 259, 259-96 (Anthony I. Ogus ed., 2001) (exploring the alternatives of 
regulation and incentives); Cass R. Sunstein, The Functions of Regulatory Statutes, in 
Regulation, Economics and the Law, supra, at 3, 3-34 (exploring the nature and uses 
of regulatory statutes). The general economic efficiency and prudential propriety of 
both regulation and tax-and-spend programs form part of an old debate within the 
field of public finance. See generally Robert Howse, supra (asserting that government 
can bring about social change without returning to command-and-control approaches 
or relying on economically self-interested market behavior). 
173 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment 
Discrimination Laws 480-94 (1992) (criticizing the ADA as economically inefficient); 
Stewart J. Schwab & Steven L. Willborn, Reasonable Accommodation of Workplace 
Disabilities, 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1197, 1276-83 (2003) (arguing for an extension 
of the ADA by allowing disabled employees to pay for their extra-reasonable ac- 
commodations); Sue A. Krenek, Note, Beyond Reasonable Accommodation, 72 Tex. 
L. Rev. 1969, 2009-13 (1994) (proposing to effectuate accommodations through a 
public-private partnership wherein private employers pay for permanent improve- 
ments to their physical plants and the federal government pays for the rest); Scott A. 
Moss & Daniel A. Malin, Note, Public Funding For Disability Accommodations: A 
Rational Solution to Rational Discrimination and the Disabilities of the ADA, 33 
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 197, 219-31 (1998) (arguing for a grant system to federally 
fund reasonable disability accommodation in the workplace). 
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By conceiving of ADA accommodation costs as antidiscrimina- 
tion rather than by characterizing it as a subsidy program, however, 
Congress sent a clear message that the ADA's remedies are in- 
tended to correct past injustice rather than acting as a charitable 
handout. Congress declared that the statute's main purpose was 
"to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the 
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabili- 
ties,"174 by promulgating "clear, strong, consistent, [and] enforce- 
able standards addressing" both individual and systematic forms of 
discrimination.175 
This language indicates that Congress, through passage of the 
ADA, wanted to bring about sweeping changes in social policy. 
Hence, Congress's overt intention in promulgating the statute was 
to raise the level at which social exclusions of the disabled would 
be examined by courts in the future.176 Moreover, in its legislative 
findings Congress used language culled from Supreme Court deci- 
sions approving equal protection classifications.177 The use of this 
specific language in the ADA, responding to what the Supreme 
Court required for heightened constitutional scrutiny circa 1990, 
demonstrates that Congress was consciously attempting to frame 
ADA remedies as part of an antisubordination agenda, which is a 
classic goal of civil rights law.178 
IV. AN INITIAL EXPRESSIVE LAW ANALYSIS OF THE ADA 
An initial expressive law analysis of the ADA indicates that the 
statute has the potential to legislate a belief change regarding indi- 
viduals with disabilities by educating mainstream individuals about 
174 42 U.S.C. ? 12101(b)(1) (1994). 
175 Id. ? 12101(b)(2). 176 Id. ? 12101; see also Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 613 (1999) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The congressional findings... serve as a useful aid for 
courts to discern the sorts of discrimination with which Congress was concerned."); 
Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 494 (1999) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (opin- 
ing that the findings section affords "[t]he strongest clues to Congress' perception of 
the domain of the Americans with Disabilities Act"). 177 See Burgdorf, supra note 155, at 436; Silvers & Stein, supra note 136, at 88-96. 
178See Bagenstos, supra note 104, at 833-35; Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination 
Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1003,1007-10 (1986); 
Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 107, 154- 
55 (1976); Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 Ga. L. Rev. 245, 247-49 
(1983). 
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people with disabilities, and by creating tri-order sanctions against 
discrimination. Moreover, during the period in which this belief 
change is effectuated, the ADA imposes a financial sanction for dis- 
crimination. 
A. Information: The Disability Rights Chronology 
Unlike other minority groups, disabled Americans were empow- 
ered by civil rights legislation prior to a general elevation of social 
consciousness about their circumstances and capabilities.'9 Before 
marshalling support for the ADA's passage, the disability rights 
movement encompassed hundreds of individual groups, each of 
which represented and advocated on behalf of a different constitu- 
ency.180 
To take one example, the protest by deaf and hearing impaired 
students demanding appointment of a deaf president at Gallaudet 
University8' was unconnected to People First's advocacy on behalf 
of developmentally disabled individuals.'82 The campaign for the 
ADA's passage unified these previously fractured advocates.'83 De- 
79 See generally Shapiro, supra note 155, at 184-210 (discussing the rise and impor- 
tance of self-advocacy); David Pfeiffer, Overview of the Disability Movement: His- 
tory, Legislative Record, and Political Implications, 21 Pol'y Stud. J. 724, 724-32 
(1993) (discussing the history and legislative record of the disability movement). 180 Shapiro, supra note 155, at 61-63. 181 See generally Jack R. Gannon, The Week The World Heard Gallaudet (1989) 
(explaining the importance of the student protest to the civil rights movement for deaf 
and hearing impaired people); Mary Elena Fernandez, Gallaudet Recaptures Spirit of 
Historic '88 March; On Anniversary, Protesters Use Same Route to Press New Con- 
cerns for the Deaf, Wash. Post, Mar. 12, 1998, at B3 (explaining that "students shut 
down their school to demand the appointment of a deaf president"). 
'82For a description of the People First movement, see Charles K. Curtis, The 
Changing Role of the People First Advisor, Am. Rehabilitation, Apr.-May-June 1984, 
at 6 (describing the development of a People First chapter); see also Dirk Johnson, 
Tight Labor Supply Creates Jobs for the Mentally Disabled, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 
1999, at Al (mentioning a People First protest of an employer's hiring practices). See 
generally Independent Living for Physically Disabled People: Developing, Imple- 
menting, and Evaluating Self-Help Rehabilitation Programs (Nancy M. Crewe & Ir- 
ving Kenneth Zola eds., 1983) (arguing that disabled people, including the mentally 
disabled, can and should live independently). 
18As noted by ADA lobbyist Liz Savage: "People with epilepsy now will be advo- 
cates for the same piece of legislation as people who are deaf.... That has never 
happened before." Shapiro, supra note 155, at 126-27. See generally Richard K. 
Scotch, Politics and Policy in the History of the Disability Rights Movement, 67 Mil- 
Virginia Law Review 
spite this temporary phenomenon, people with disabilities remain 
largely uncoordinated, without either an acknowledged figurehead 
(paralleling, for example, Jesse Jackson), or a central political vi- 
sion (such as that expressed by NOW or NAACP) through which 
to voice their concerns and desires.184 
Because people with disabilities were empowered with civil 
rights absent the necessary political tools and organization for in- 
ducing a general elevation of social consciousness, it falls to the 
ADA to educate mainstream society about this previously un- 
known group. The statute does so in two ways. First, by providing 
information through its legislative findings regarding the relative 
position of people with disabilities in society.18 This is especially 
true in its statements about artificial exclusion as the cause of social 
participation, as opposed to inherent necessity.186 Second, by re- 
quiring places of public accommodation be made readily accessi- 
ble, Title III187 affords people with disabilities a greater opportunity 
to participate in social function. Together, these features lessen the 
identity of the disabled as "other" and increase non-disableds' gen- 
eral familiarity with people with disabilities. 
Hence, following the ADA's promulgation, an employer who 
reads the statute (or consults with a lawyer as to its effects), is pre- 
sented with a different vision of disability identity than that previ- 
ously held. If she had lacked information regarding the role of dis- 
abled workers in society, the ADA has now updated her knowledge 
and beliefs. If she had been ambivalent about excluding disabled 
workers, the ADA's passage has now "tipped" her from being a 
fence-sitter towards an inclusive equilibrium. Further, when an em- 
ployer encounters people with disabilities in other areas of social 
activity, say at a baseball game or when riding on public transpor- 
tation, she becomes acclimated to the presence of persons from 
whom she was previously sheltered. This effect, in combination 
bank Q. 380, 389-90 (1989) (describing the then-emerging pan-disability rights move- 
ment). 
"84 The formation and continuing development of the American Association of Peo- 
ple with Disabilities, with its focus on securing accessible voting and political partici- 
pation, is a welcome and promising change. The website can be found at 
http://www.aapd.com. 5 See supra Section III.B. 186 See supra Section III.B. 
187 42 U.S.C. ?? 12181-12189 (2000). 
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with the educational information contained in the ADA, will influ- 
ence an employer to embrace the notion that people with disabili- 
ties belong in the mainstream, including the workplace. This is true 
particularly because the general impetus to exclude disabled peo- 
ple arises from paternalism rather than from animus.'88 
B. Tri-Order Sanctions: The Moral Cost of Discrimination 
Recall that Congress framed the ADA as a civil rights remedy, 
rather than as a subsidy program.'89 In doing so, the legislature ar- 
ticulated a group-based antisubordination theory that was to evis- 
cerate practices of systemic subordination.'9 As such, the ADA's 
goal is to alter employer behavior that contributes to unacceptable 
systemic patterns of social and economic subordination.'19 This is 
because of the premise that "employers who have a choice be- 
tween participating in a subordinating system and working (at rea- 
sonable cost) against such a system have a moral obligation to re- 
spond in a way that reduces subordination."'92 
Framed as an antidiscrimination device, the ADA contains three 
levels of sanctions that can change social norms towards people 
with disabilities. First order sanctions cause individuals to alter their 
own behavior because the law induces them to change their tastes. 
Second order sanctions operate by creating a fear of individuals bear- 
ing social sanction. Third order sanctions pressure individuals 
through societal sanction. 
88 See supra Section III.B. 
189 See supra Section III.B.2. 
90 For two recent and thoughtful variations on this theme, see Robert Post, Prejudi- 
cial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 
9, 17 (2000) (arguing that the rationale underlying current antidiscrimination law 
seeks to liberate individuals from the thrall of socially held stereotypes, when in real- 
ity law itself can do no more than reshape the nature and content of those conven- 
tions); Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anti- 
classification or Antisubordination, Issues in Legal Scholarship, The Origins and Fate 
of Antisubordination Theory, at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss2/artll (averring that 
the normative goals of anticlassification and antisubordination, usually considered in 
opposition to each other, "are better understood as regulating overlapping groups of 
practices and that their application shifts over time, in response to social contestation 
and social struggle"). 
191 See Bagenstos, supra note 104, at 837-38. 
'92 Id. at 838. 
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As a first order sanction, the fact that Congress promulgated the 
ADA as an antidiscrimination measure signals to individuals that the 
majority of the electorate believes that discriminating against the dis- 
abled is morally wrong. According to the belief change theory, and 
also extrapolating the points that Professor Robert Cooter has made 
in a more general context, 93 disability law can also influence the 
process of belief change in two ways. First, in formulating a law re- 
garding the disabled, and thus creating a legal duty on behalf of 
employers, Congress can increase an individual employer's willing- 
ness to embrace that duty as part of her larger duties of citizenship. 
Second, individuals who believe they are required to obey the 
ADA's precepts will alter their preferences in order to behave in a 
manner in accord with that mandate. These two processes "tip" an 
individual's behavior towards a new equilibrium of behavior. 
Even if the ADA does not convince individual employers who 
would prefer to continue to exclude disabled workers,'94 however, 
the framing of disability-based exclusion as a moral wrong can 
convince those individual employers not to exercise that prefer- 
ence in fear of social condemnation. This is true whether the censure 
arises through formal or informal channels. 
Moreover, in combination with either or both of the previous two 
orders of sanction, the ADA can cause other members of an em- 
ployer's society to bear social pressure and condemnation upon them 
until they abstain from excluding disabled workers. Again, this is 
true especially due to the exclusion of employees with disabilities 
not motivated by animus.'19 
C. Financial Sanctions: Increasing the Utility Cost of Discrimination 
Finally, the ADA has a belief change effect for the traditional 
("Old Chicago") reason that it creates monetary sanctions for dis- 
criminating against individuals with disabilities in the workplace.196 
193 See generally Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Eco- 
nomic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1577, 1600 (2000) (arguing that 
"[f]or citizens who intrinsically value obeying the law... the enactment of the law in- 
creases their willingness to do their duty"). 
'94 This argument works regardless of whether the underlying reason is motivated by 
overt prejudice, benign paternalism, or ignorance of true cost. 195 See supra Section III.B. 
196 42 U.S.C. ?? 2000e-5(g), 12117 (2000). 
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Modeled after Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,197 the ADA 
consciously tracks many of its provisions and offers several means 
for prosecuting claims.98 These include the requirement that em- 
ployers engage in an "interactive process" with disabled workers 
requesting those workplace alterations,99 the formal filing of a dis- 
ability discrimination complaint with a local Equal Employment 
Opportunities Commission ("EEOC") office,200 the request for 
mediation,201 and lawsuits brought against those employers either 
by aggrieved individuals or by the EEOC or Department of Justice 
suing on their behalf.202 Each of these measures in turn carries in- 
creasingly heavy transaction costs for employers. Thus, regardless 
of whether employers continue to ultimately prove victorious in 
defending federal court suits,203 the ADA has added a transaction 
cost that reduces the overall utility to individual employers of exer- 
cising a preference for excluding disabled workers. Accordingly, by 
providing sanctions, the ADA motivates individual employers to 
reconsider acting on preferences that exclude disabled individuals 
from employment. 
CONCLUSION 
By utilizing a qualitative metric, Rights of Inclusion makes a 
valuable contribution to the literature examining the post-ADA ef- 
fects on workers and others with disabilities. As noted above, the 
currently utilized gauge directly links the ADA's efficacy to aggre- 
197 Civil Rights Act of 1964 ? 703, 42 U.S.C. ? 2000(e)-2(a) (2000) (prohibiting em- 
ployment practices that result in disparate treatment as well as those causing dispa- 
rate impact). 198 See S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 43 (1989); H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 82-83 
(1990). 199 29 C.F.R. ?? 1630.2(o)(3), 1630.9 (2003). See generally Amy Renee Brown, Note, 
Mental Disabilities Under the ADA: The Role of Employees and Employers in the 
Interactive Process, 8 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 341, 352-68 (2002) (describing judicial 
interpretations of the interactive process); Comment, Determining Reasonable Ac- 
commodations Under the ADA: Why Courts Should Require Employers to Partici- 
pate in an "Interactive Process," 30 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 513, 542-45 (1999) (describing 
components for an "optimal interactive process"). 200 42 U.S.C. ? 2000(e)(5) (2000); 29 C.F.R. ?? 1601.6-.8 (2003) (establishing the 
guidelines for this process). 201 42 U.S.C. ? 12212 (2000). 202 Id. ? 12117. 
203 See supra Introduction. 
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gate employment rate levels.20 This provides a serviceable under- 
standing of post-ADA effects, and raises disquieting and worth- 
while questions,205 but only from an external, and essentially 
anonymous, perspective. By emphasizing the recursive nature of 
rights identity formation, Engel and Munger lend insight and nu- 
ance into how the ADA affects the lives of the individuals it was 
meant to assist. For disability rights advocates, this is a useful point 
of view, especially at a time when the ADA is considered be- 
sieged.26 
Nevertheless, because the authors' thesis is heavily dependent 
on internal and conceptualized notions of self-empowerment, 
Rights of Inclusion tends to downplay the external stimuli that also 
generate rights identity.207 This absence is noteworthy for three rea- 
sons. First, it is counter-factual to several of the disability life sto- 
ries portrayed in the book. The respective employers of both Bill 
Meier208 and Sara Lane,09 for instance, each provided accommoda- 
tions sua sponte after the passage of the ADA. 
Second, by focusing on the internal nature of recursive rights 
identity formation to the exclusion of external generation, Rights 
of Inclusion falls prey to the theoretical flaw that it asserts exists in 
204 See supra Introduction. 
205 See Stein, supra note 16, at 1684-90. 
206For instance, the assertion of a backlash against disability rights was explored 
from a number of different angles in Marta Russell, Backlash, the Political Economy, 
and Structural Exclusion, 21 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 335, 336 (2000) (averring 
"that the backlash to the ADA has been prompted by capitalist opposition"). Russell 
asserts that this "capitalist opposition" has "promoted the backlash among groups of 
workers who have become fearful that their own interests are in jeopardy as a result 
of the Act's enforcement powers." Id. Professor Stephen Percy has noted that critics 
of the ADA have characterized the Act as an unacceptable "instance of expansive 
regulatory mandates on the private sector." Stephen L. Percy, Administrative Reme- 
dies and Legal Disputes: Evidence on Key Controversies Underlying Implementation 
of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 21 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 413, 433 
(2000). 
207 The authors do acknowledge the influence of exogenous factors such as employ- 
ers acting on their own initiative, but do not adequately develop this theory in Rights 
of Inclusion on those actions. They do, however, elaborate this notion in an earlier 
work. See David M. Engel & Frank W. Munger, Re-Interpreting the Effect of Rights: 
Career Narratives and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 Ohio St. L.J. 285, 329 
(2001). 
208 Bill was allowed to more-or-less self-create a job at which he is very successful. 
Engel & Munger, supra note 15, at 200-01. 
Sara was provided with a closed-off workspace. Id. at 26-27. 
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critical rights jurisprudence.210 Namely, that if disabled workers 
(and, to make the point stronger, their employers) believe that the 
ADA is a powerful tool when it really is not, then those ADA 
rights are deceptive and ultimately illusory. 
Third, and this factor is crucial to an expressive law analysis, al- 
though the identity formation of rights bearers is an important fac- 
tor (and Engel and Munger are to be praised for so staunchly ad- 
vocating this perspective), so is the change in general social norms. 
Because these are measured from the perspective of the belief 
change engendered in the actions of potential discriminators, it is 
best seen from not only an internal view, but from an external ex- 
pressive law perspective as well. 
210 See supra Section I.C. 
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